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Happiness, The Life of Virtue 
and Friendship: 
Theological Reflections on 
Aristotelian Themes 
STANLEY HAUERWAS 
Part I: On Being Temporally Happy 
THE PROBLEM WITH HAPPINESS 
I am not happy with happiness. I do not trust being happy and I tend not to 
trust happy people. For how can anyone who is happy know what the world is 
like? We live in a world of suffering and tragedy that defies attempts to be 
happy. I especially distrust people who try to be happy because happiness, what-
ever it is, does not seem to be something we can accomplish. The kind of self-
involvement that trying to be happy entails is simply incompatible with the disin-
terestedness which is characteristic of genuinely good people. 
I particularly distrust the notion of happiness when it is associated with reli-
gion. For example, when Christianity is commended as a religion of happiness it 
always seems to lose any critical bite. It becomes a religion promising satisfac-
tion for the well-off such that the radical demands of the gospel are overlooked 
or explained away. As a religion of happiness, Christianity becomes a general 
form of religiosity that is so functionally useful the question of whether it is true 
hardly makes any difference. Moreover, if Christianity is about happiness then 
what are we to make of the repeated and insistent claims that suffering is the 
hallmark of the Christian life? 
Because of this general unhappiness I have tended to avoid the language of 
happiness when thinking or writing about matters moral. This seems a bit odd, 
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however, as no one has influenced me more that Aristotle, and the Nichomach-
ean Ethics begins and ends with a discussion of happiness. Moreover, accounts 
of the moral life that stress Lhe importance of virtue usually involve a teleological 
account which entails some sense of self-fulfillment. In my attempt to avoid hap-
piness as a theme, therefore, I have used, somewhat arbitrarily, only the middle 
books of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics and have developed an ethic of virtue 
that only promises faithfulness which may accidentally provide a sense of fulfill-
ment. 
Yet I suspect there is something deeply wrong with any attempt to give an 
account of the moral life that avoids happiness or at least makes it a secondary 
phenomenon. It may be that happiness is wrongly thought to be the end of the 
moral !if e, but it is quite another matter to think it has no relevance to living 
well. Moreover, no account of Christian ethics can avoid dealing with happiness, 
not only because it is such a prominent human concern, but also because the 
very nature of the Christian life entails a sense of well-being that is surely not 
entirely unlike what some have meant by happiness. 
My sense of ambiguity about happiness is captured best by two scenes from 
Lhe rccenl movie, Tender Mercies. In Lhe first, Mac Sledge, after being Laid his 
daughter has died, is seen hoeing weeds in his garden. His new wife, who has 
helped him recover some sense of dignity, stands silently at the edge of the gar-
den. Mac, without looking at her, says several times, " I don't believe in happi-
ness." She makes no attempt to persuade him otherwise. Yet the movie closes 
with Mac throwing a football with his young stepson as if nothing else mattered. 
Like Mac, I do not believe in happiness, but I do believe in throwing footballs 
with stepsons. The problem is knowing how to describe the latter as a way of life. 
I am going lo try, therefore, to develop an account of happiness that I hope 
will do justice to our moral experience as well as suggest the role happiness 
might play in the life of those who desire to be Christians. As a way to explore 
the nature and role of happiness in the moral life, I am going to undertake an 
analysis of Aristotle's account of happiness. That turn to Aristotle is not surpris-
ing because it is a common assumption that his account in many ways still re-
mains unsurpassed. I must say, however, that while I hope the analysis I develop 
is true to Aristotle, my primary interest is not interpreting Aristotle correctly--
whatever that would mean. Rather, I am primarily concerned lo use Aristotle to 
further how Christians oughl to think about happiness. In Lhe process, however, I 
hope to suggest why Aristotle's account is still so important--not only for what he 
says but for how his analysis is structured. 
Of particular interest to me is Aristotle's claim that happiness "requires com-
pleteness in virtue as well as a complete lifetime" (1100a3-5).1 Much of what I 
will attempt is to try to understand what such an observation could possibly 
mean. IL is not only unclear what or how we could ever have completeness in 
virtue, but even more puzzling is the claim it takes a complete lifetime. For ex-
am pie, one of the implications of such a claim would seem to be that feeling 
happy is no guarantee we are happy. Put even more strongly, if you think or feel 
you are happy it is a good indication you are in the grip of an illusion or, even 
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worse, are deeply self-deceived. For according to Aristotle, it seems that happi-
ness comes not during, but al the end of our life--thus the fear of untimely death. 
Happiness is the characteristic of those who live in a manner such that the end 
of their Life confirms the way they have lived. As I hope to show, the happy per-
son, thus, is one who can claim their death as their own. 
Objections to such an account of happiness seem obvious since it seems we 
can be sure we are truly happy only when it is too late to enjoy that state. Yet I 
want to show that Aristotle's account of happiness is more plausible than it may 
at first appear. For I think Aristotle is rightly struggling to take account of the 
contingent and temporal character of our existence. That may not seem very sig-
nificant if we fail to acknowledge, either personally or in our moral theory, how 
lime can appear to be the great enemy of morality. For example, just think how, 
on a personal level, what appeared to be so clearly right later appears as pathetic 
if not positively corrupt. So often, both existentially and in theory, morality 
seems to be an attempt to defeat the necessity of such retrospective judgments in 
the hopes of securing moral consistency--a consistency that seems crucial if we 
are to achieve happiness. 
Recognition of the timefulness necessarily means we must deal with questions 
of moral change and continuity. We usually think we ought to do some changing 
in our lives, but it is by no means clear how that conviction is compatible with 
our sense that a person of character has a stability that insures we can trust them 
to be who they are. As we shall see, Aristotle's analysis of the kind of person we 
must be to be capable of true happiness manifests rather than resolves this ambi-
guity. Exactly because his account of happiness does this, I hope to show that it 
is a particularly rich resource for helping understand what it might mean for 
Christians to be happy. 
HAPPINESS AS THE GOOD AND FINAL END 
Where do you begin an analysis of the moral life? It has been the tendency of 
modern ethicists to begin their reflections on morality from as formal and mini-
mal a starting point as possible. They have done so in the hopes of finding a 
foundation for ethics that is non-arbitrary and rationally compelling--that is, one 
not temporally determined. Aristotle begins in quite a different manner. He sim-
ply asks what most people think living life well involves--that is, what is the high-
est good. He suggests that many claim morality is about being happy, and he is 
willing to begin with that assumption. Yet Aristotle, in Socratic fashion, does not 
assume he knows what happiness entails for that is exactly the issue that needs 
investigation. Therefore, Aristotle accepts the common assumption that the 
highest good has to do with happiness only in the hope of tempting us lo follow 
him with an investigation of that claim. We must be careful, therefore, not to 
assume any one statement adequately summarizes Aristotle's views about happi-
ness as he constantly nuances his first formulations by further argument. 
For example, Aristotle begins by observing that though all agree that happi-
ness is the "highest good attainable by action," when they try to define happiness 
there is little agreement. Many say that happiness is some pleasure and/or 
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wealth; some identify happiness with different things at different times (thus, 
when sick it is health, when poor it is wealth, and so on); and some, the more 
cultivated who have thought about such matters, think happiness cannot consist 
in a list of goods but must be a good in and of itself which is the cause of all 
these goods (1095a20-30). Obviously the initial agreement on happiness as the 
"highest good" requires further analysis in order to be plausible. 
Yet it is important to note that Aristotle does not assume that such analysis 
can be successful by ignoring what people actually want and desire. Happiness is 
not the result, as later Stoic thinkers would claim, of the eradication of desire. 
We will not be happy, according to Aristotle, if we purge our lives of all desires, 
but only when we desire the right things rightly. But even the most cultivated 
desires, such as that for honor, cannot bring happiness since honor depends on 
the opinions of others. Therefore, to be happy, Aristotle suggests we must desire 
that which cannot easily be taken away from us (1095b25-28). 
As we shall see, this is a particularly important aspect of Aristotle's account of 
happiness. For though he says it can only be a "guess," at this point he continues 
to assume that happiness must be that which we cannot lose either through the 
actions of others or by outrageous fate. Thus he maintains that the happy person 
will have the attribute of permanence and he will remain happy 
throughout his life. For he will always or to the highest degree both do 
and contemplate what is in conformity with virtue; he will bear the 
vicissitudes of fortune most nobly and with perfect decorum under all 
circumstances, inasmuch as he is truly good and "four-square beyond 
reproach" (1100b16-23). 
Even more strongly he argues that 
no supremely happy man can even become miserable, for he will never 
do what is hateful and base. For in our opinion, the man who is truly 
good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune may bring, and 
will always act as nobly as circumstances permit, just as a good general 
makes the most strategic use of the troops at his disposal, and a good 
shoemaker makes the best shoe he can from the leather available, and 
so on with experts in all other fields (1100b35-1101a6). 
Yet Aristotle notes that there are reversals in fortune that can happen even to 
the happy man that can prevent him from being "supremely happy." Thus in 
Book Seven he says, 
those who assert that a man is happy even on the rack and even when 
great misfortunes befall him, provided he is good, are talking nonsense, 
whether they know it or not. Since happiness also needs fortune, some 
people regard good fortune as identical with happiness. But that is not 
true, for even good fortune, if excessive, can be an obstruction; perhaps 
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we are, in that case, no longer justified in calling it "good fortune," for 
its definition is determined by its relation to happiness (1153b20-24). 
We thus have an increasingly complex picture. Aristotle accepts the general 
assumption that happiness is the satisfaction of desire, but the question of the 
kind of desire we should have to be happy is not easily determined. He suggests 
that it must be a desire for that which is not easily lost, that is, that which will not 
be subject to the fortunes or time; yet it is unclear what could possibly satisfy 
such a demand. 
In order to investigate this issue we must return to Aristotle's claim that hap-
piness is the final end. As we have seen, Aristotle begins his account of happi-
ness assuming that happiness has to do with an end, that is, the highest good 
attainable by action. This assumption reflects his general view that "all knowl-
edge and every choice is directed toward some good" (1095a15). Every human 
activity has some good such that 
it is one thing in medicine, another in strategy, and another again in 
each of the arts. What, then, is the good of each? Is it not that for the 
sake of which everything else is done? That means it is health in the 
case of medicine, victory in the case of strategy, a house in the case of 
building, a different thing in the case of different arts, and in all actions 
and choices it is the end. For it is for the sake of the end that all else is 
done. Thus, if there is some one end for all that we do, this would be the 
good attainable by actions; if there are several ends, they will be the 
good attainable by action (1097a17-24). 
It is important to note the conditional in the last sentence, for Aristotle at this 
point does not assume that there is any one end for all that we do. He notes that 
it is obvious that there are many ends--e.g., wealth, health, power--that are 
means to something else. Thus, it is not obvious that all ends are final, but if 
there is one good it must be something final. But what would it mean for such an 
end to be final? It is an end, he suggests, that can be pursued for itself and not 
for something else. It is not a means to anything. And such a description seems 
to apply to happiness above all else: 
for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the 
sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we 
choose partly for themselves--for we would choose each of them even if 
no further advantage would accrue from them--but we also choose them 
partly for the sake of happiness because we assume that it is through 
them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses 
happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means 
to anything at all (1097bl-7). 
Such a claim, however, is anything but obvious. Is Aristotle suggesting that 
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happiness is dominant in the sense that everything that we do is ultimately done 
for it? If so, such a view seems to presuppose a view of human action that is 
clearly mistaken. I may jog to lose weight, and I may desire to lose weight to 
better my health, and I may desire to better my health in order to live longer, 
and I may desire to live longer because--well, I am not sure why I desire to live 
longer. The reason I am not sure why I desire to live longer is not simply be-
cause I lack a clear aim in my life that requires more time, but because "desiring 
to live longer" is a complex set of desires that involves everything from wanting 
to see the Cubs win a World Series to enjoying a friendship. To describe the fi-
nal end in such a singular manner simply fails to do justice to the complex nature 
of our desires. 
Moreover, there simply seems to be something wrong about Aristotle's as-
sumption that one action is always a means to something else. I may jog, even as 
boring as jogging is, for my health, but it is by no means clear that my jogging 
can best be described as a "means" at all. On the contrary, I jog because I like to 
jog. While I am glad that jogging can result in better health, the reason that I jog 
cannot be so easily explained. Indeed, any explanation for jogging, like any ac-
count of why we should desire to live longer, necessarily turns out to be complex. 
Before we get too taken with such criticism, however, I think we need to re-
consider what Aristotle is trying to say. Certainly Aristotle is not suggesting that 
simply because every action has an end, even if that end is itself, that therefore 
all actions have a common end. Nor is he suggesting, though it is easy to be mis-
led here by his examples, that there is some particular act to whose end all oth-
ers are subordinate.2 Rather we must be particularly careful to note why Aris-
totle calls happiness a "final" good for he does not mean happiness is one 
among others. The point is that happiness, rather than being analogous to other 
goods we desire, is different in the sense it is sufficient in itself. And by "self-suf-
ficient" he means that "which taken by itself makes life something desirable and 
deficient in nothing" (1097b15). 
The criticism I made above of Aristotle's suggestion that all our activities are 
a means to the end of our happiness turns out to be misplaced. For this is exactly 
the notion Aristotle needs to display how happiness is a final end. As Ackrill 
says, 
Eudaimonia--what all men want--is not the result or outcome of a 
lifetime's effort; it is not something to look forward to (like a contented 
retirement), it is a life, enjoyable and worthwhile all through. Various 
bits of it must themselves be enjoyable and worthwhile, not just means 
for bringing about subsequent bits. That the primary ingredients of 
eudaimonia for the sake of eudaimonia is not incompatible with their 
being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia is constituted by activities that 
are ends in themselves.3 
Only if eudaimonia has such a character could it be a good that cannot easily be 
taken away from us. Indeed, that is why it might even be possible to be happy on 
Aristotelian Themes: On Being Temporally Happy 11 
the rack even though by being such we may not be supremely happy. 
If this is the case, then we can see why many commentators on Aristotle resist 
translating eudaimonia as happiness. For happiness is not an "end" that can be 
pursued or achieved separately from the kind of life we lead. Our life is not a 
means to some end called happiness. Rather eudaimonia is the name Aristotle 
gives to "the best possible life,'"' which means it is impossible to abstract the 
meaning of happiness from the display of such a life--thus the virtues. We can 
now understand why since it is not so much an end or a way of life. But if not 
one end among others, how is such a way to be specified? How are we to under-
stand the material content of happiness so construed? To answer these ques-
tions, we must turn to Aristotle's understanding of the ergon (function) of man. 
WHAT EUDAJMONIA IS AND HOW IT IS ACQUIRED 
The ever-candid Aristotle observed that it is "perhaps a little trite" to call eu-
daimonia the highest good and a clearer account is still required. He suggests 
that perhaps this can best be done by asking what is the proper function (ergon) 
of man {lo<J7b21-25). 
For just as the goodness and performance of a flute player, a sculptor, 
or any kind of expert, and generally of anyone who fulfills some function 
or performs some action, are thought to reside in his proper function, so 
the goodness and performance of man would seem to reside in his 
proper function (lo<J7b25-30). 
Aristotle's appeal to "function" at this point in his argument has often been 
criticized as viciously circular or as an unnecessary piece of metaphysics, since it 
only results in telling us that certain excellences are essential for happiness.5 
Moreover, some have taken him to mean that the "good of man" that correlates 
with his function is a single thing in a manner that excludes all other goods. 
However, the latter criticism is clearly wrong. Aristotle, as I have tried to sug-
gest, assumes that there are many different goods for man. Again, I think it is 
crucial that we not be misled by Aristotle's appeal to "a function," by remember-
ing that he only proposes it as a way to explore further the nature of happiness 
as a characteristic of all our activities. 
To discover man's proper function Aristotle notes that just as the eye, hand, 
or foot has its proper function, so must man have some function over and above 
the functions of his various parts. That function cannot be just living as he has 
that in common with the plants. Nor is man's function that of perception, as he 
has that in common with every animal. That leaves 
an active life of the rational element. The rational element has two 
parts: one is rational in that it obeys the rule of reason, the other in that 
it possesses and conceives rational rules. Since the expression 'life of the 
rational element' also can be used in two senses, we must make it clear 
that we mean a life determined by the activity, as opposed to the mere 
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possession, of the rational element. For the activity, it seems, has a 
greater claim to be the function of man. The proper function of man, 
then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational 
principle or, at least, not without it (1098a2-8) . 
Again many have found fault with Aristotle's concentration on " reason" as 
the distinguishing mark of the human. It is often pointed out that there are 
countless things people do besides reasoning. Moreover, if there is any distinct-
iveness to human activity qua human activity, it does not reside in any one 
"mark"; but rather consists in the complex ways people have learned to coordi-
nate the capacities and skills they share with all life. While Aristotle's use of the 
language of function leaves him open to such criticism, it is clear, I think, that he 
does not mean to suggest that the many things which people do are inconsequen-
tial to understanding human activity. Rather his point is the more simple--
namely that "rationality'' is simply not one activity among others that men do, 
but it is the activity that pervades all we do. Indeed it is exactly that power that 
allows us to coordinate the many capacities and skills we possess.6 
Moreover, once having made the suggestion that the distinctively human is 
exhibited in our rational activity, Aristotle proceeds immediately to muddy those 
already cloudy waters. He says that by "proper function" he means the same 
kind as the function of an individual who sets high standards for himself: thus the 
proper function of a harpist is that of one who has set high standards for himself 
(1098a8-10). Therefore "rational activity'' is not some minimum possessed by all, 
though all men have the potential to possess it, but rather it is a high standard 
that is a mark of distinction. 
Thus in a summary passage Aristotle says, 
On these assumptions, if we take the proper function of man to be a 
certain kind of life, and if this kind of life is an activity of the soul and 
consists in actions performed in conjun.ction with the rational element, 
and if a man of high standards is he who performs these actions well 
and properly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in 
accordance with the excellence appropriate to it; we reach the 
conclusion that the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity 
with the best and most complete. But we must add 'in a complete life.' 
For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one sunny day; 
similarly, one day or a short time does not make a man blessed and 
happy (1098a12-20). 
So, rationality as the function of man is but the means Aristotle uses to note 
the whole set of virtues man needs to live well over the span of a life. For even 
though Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical reason, and 
later suggests that contemplation is the form of life that most nearly approaches 
happiness (1177b24-26), he in fact assumes that practical reason is as much the 
source of happiness as the theoretical. Indeed it seems odd that he should sug-
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gest that the practical life is happy only in a secondary sense (1178a9); while he 
bases his claim of the superiority of contemplation on its similarity to the gods 
(1178b25-30), that would make man's happiness based on an attribute which is 
not in his power, which is not his own function. Perhaps that is why Aristotle says 
that "happiness is some kind of study or contemplation," (1178b31) thus leaving 
vague the kind of activity he takes as his ideal. 
Aristotle's emphasis on contemplation as the highest ideal certainly gives 
good grounds for those who would criticize him for an overly intellectual account 
of human activity. Yet such criticism fails to note the life of contemplation is im-
possible if we are not first living a virtuous life that entails the whole great gamut 
of human activities. Moreover, Aristotle never loses his good sense, for even 
though he is attracted to contemplation because of its promise of self-sufficiency, 
yet he maintains even the contemplative man 
will need external well-being, since we are only human. Our nature is 
not self-sufficient for engaging in study: our body must be healthy and 
we must have food and generally be cared for. Nevertheless, if it is not 
possible for a man lo be supremely happy without external goods, we 
must not think that his needs will be great and many in order to be 
happy; for self-sufficiency and moral action do not consist in an excess 
(of possessions) (1178b31-1179a22; see also, 1099a30-32). 
The significance of these last considerations has often been overlooked by 
those who criticize Aristotle's account of happiness as too intellectualistic. As I 
have tried to suggest, happiness for Aristotle is not some single activity 
to whose end the needs of all other human activities should be 
subordinated. He is not saying that there is some one end, the same 
one, of all particular actions. Virtuous activity or living humanly well do 
not signify one thing because there are different kinds of virtue and our 
happiness or perfection or ultimate end is constituted, not by some one 
virtue, but to the degree this is possible by them all.7 
Happiness, it turns out, is thus a name of a set of virtuous activities. As Aristotle 
says,"eudaimonia is some kind of activity of the soul in conformity with virtue. 
All the other goods are either necessary prerequisites for happiness, or are by 
nature co-workers with it and useful instruments for attaining it" (1099b25-28). 
But why then all the emphasis on "rationality as the function of man" and the 
corresponding suggestion that contemplation promises to be our best chance for 
happiness? Aristotle's own account of the complexity of practical reason cer-
tainly provides little basis for the assumption that theoretical reason is superior. 
Indeed, from the point of view of how we must actually live our lives, the moral 
virtues and the virtues of the practical intellect take precedence over those of the 
theoretical. Our final end, therefore, is not some particular good among others 
but is "constituted by a plurality of virtuous activities."8 
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I think one of the reasons Aristotle emphasized so strongly the importance of 
reason and contemplation as the ultimate form of the happy life was due to his 
haunting sense of the effect of time and fortune on the moral life.9 For contem-
plation, thinking on those things that cannot be other than they are, seems to 
promise the kind of permanence that can make us impervious to outrageous 
fate. Yet he never assumed that contemplation was sufficient to insure an eu-
daemonistic life since what finally makes such a life possible, even one of con-
templation, is our having a character sufficient to bear the vicissitudes of fortune 
nobly (1100b17-21).10 As I noted above, Aristotle was keenly aware that frequent 
reverses can crush even the supremely happy. Only those who are noble and 
high-minded cannot be changed by such reverses, not because they are insensi-
tive to pain, but because, as he says, they will never do what is hateful and base 
(1100b28-35). 
Only if we are persons of virtue, therefore, is it possible for us to be happy 
through time.11 We cannot have happiness unless we have acquired the virtues 
necessary to be people of character. To have character means we have a history 
that allows us to make our lives our own. In contrast, bad people cannot be 
happy for they "do not have the element of constancy" and thus do not "remain 
similar even to themselves" (1159b5-8). Goodness, as determined through the 
virtues, provides the skill necessary for us to be steady through the good and bad 
fortune of our lives. Thus, happiness is not so much acquired as it is discovered 
in the process of living virtuously. 
That is why I suspect Aristotle cannot quite make up his mind whether happi-
ness is a gift or is acquired. For, as he says, 
if there is anything at all which comes to me as a gift from the gods, it is 
reasonable to suppose that happiness above all else is god-given; and of 
all things human it is the most likely to be god-given; inasmuch as it is 
the best. But although this subject is perhaps more appropriate to a 
different field of study, it is clear that happiness is one of the most 
divine things, even if it is not god-sent but attained through virtue and 
some kind of learning or training. And if it is better that happiness is 
acquired in this way rather than by chance, it is reasonable to assume 
that this is the way it is acquired .... To leave the greatest and noblest of 
things to chance would hardly be right (1109b10-25). u 
Perhaps now we are in a position to understand better why Aristotle insists 
that happiness requires completeness in virtue as well as a complete life. For in 
spite of his talk of happiness as the final end, we see happiness is not some ideal 
which is realizable only in the distant future. Indeed happiness is not so much an 
end, but the way. Happiness is the sense of self that comes from having acquired 
the virtues necessary to transverse the dangers and opportunities of our exis-
tence--dangers and opportunities that are intrinsic to the timeful character of 
our existence. Thus, happiness is not something that can be accomplished all at 
once. Rather it seems to be more like the ability to look back over our life and 
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be glad it is ours--in short, unless we have acq\Jired a history, a life capable of 
narration, we have nothing about which to be happy. That is why happiness may 
not be possible for the young, as they have not yet lived long enough, they have 
not acquired the virtues necessary, even to know what it means to say they are 
happy. Yet that is also why Aristotle thinks it so crucial to initiate the young into 
the life of virtue. For only such a life can give us the skill to look back truthfully 
and still claim our life as our own.13 
ON BEING HAPPILY A CHRISTIAN 
A fuller understanding of Aristotle's account of happiness obviously requires 
a discussion of the virtues and friendship. However, on the basis of the analysis 
of happiness I think some tentative theological observations can be made. As I 
suggested at the beginning, I think Aristotle can help us understand in what way 
it makes sense for Christians not only to be happy, but to desire to be happy. Let 
me now try to say why that is the case. 
Some may feel that all this is a false problem. Of course Christians can and 
should be happy. After all, they are just like anyone else. If being Christian does 
not contribute to our happiness, what good is it? Yet many in the Christian tradi-
tion have challenged just that assumption. They have done so because of their 
fundamental conviction that the gospel is meant to challenge, if not destroy, our 
presumptions about what will make us happy in this life. Christianity does not 
promise fulfillment, but rather a way to live in the world truthfully and without 
illusion. It is, after all, a little hard to believe that a people who take as their 
central belief a crucified God can believe that life is finally about happiness. 
From such a perspective, Christian convictions are more nearly true not because 
they underwrite our assumptions about what constitutes human fulfillment, but 
because Christianity challenges our facile presumptions that God is primarily 
concerned with our happiness. 
Therefore many Christian writers have suggested that suffering rather than 
happiness is the hallmark of the Christian life. While the Christian is certainly 
not encouraged to seek out bad fortune, at least for some, a bit of bad luck is 
seen as a positive aid for learning to live as a Christian. For such suffering tests 
the genuineness of the Christian's conviction that they live not for their own 
glory, but that of God. 
There is no doubt that there is something right about this emphasis. More-
over, in a culture like our own that seems bent on the satisfaction of every desire 
no matter how shallow, such a challenge appears positively salutary. In a time 
when the desire of many for happiness results in a desperate devaluing of all 
questions of significance, any challenge to the superficiality of our desires seems 
more likely right than wrong. 
Yet there also seems something wrong with any account of the Christian life 
that denies all moral significance to happiness. For the salvation wrought in Je-
sus of Nazareth, we believe, offers a new way of life that certainly brings with it a 
sense of satisfaction. The issue is how that satisfaction is to be understood. And 
in this respect I think that Aristotle is a critical resource. 
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Aristotle reminds us that happiness is not so much a goal as a way; or perhaps 
more accurately, happiness but names the kind of a person we must be if we are 
to face the nature of this existence with courage and faithfulness. In this sense, 
Aristotle helps us understand why we rightly understand the kind of life we are 
called to live as Christians as a journey rather than an answer. For what we are 
offered as Christians is not a formula for successful living, but a way to go on 
such that we will be able to look back over our lives with a sense of satisfaction--
that is, happily. 
Let me put it this way. One of the difficulties of taking up any significant way 
of life is that we never adequately understand what we are doing. Significant 
commitments are asked of us that we are not in a position to appreciate when we 
first undertake them. For example, we never know what we are doing when we 
get married.14 Indeed, you do not even know what kind of commitment you have 
made until you can look back on it twenty years later. You do not even know 
what it would mean to call a marriage happy until you have lived it for many 
years. But if that is the case then why would we ever undertake such a life? We 
do so, I think, because we do not know what we are doing. 
But what if the same is true of taking on the story of being a Christian? Most 
of us have done so not knowing what we were doing. In effect, our being Chris-
tian is more a matter of fortune than something we have done. We may regret or 
rejoice that we are so identified, but there seems little we can do about our hav-
ing been identified. But if Aristotle is right, that is the character of life itself. 
There is no way to avoid the temporal character of our existence. Our desire for 
happiness forces us to be one thing and not another. Yet fhat very desire also 
becomes the way that we can test the authenticity of the concrete embodiment of 
that desire. For any truthful way of life must admit as well as promise an answer 
to the question--"Are you happy?"15 
I take it that fundamental to Christian convictions is the assurance that any-
one who has followed the way of life we call Christianity will be able to look back 
on their life and say, " I would not have it otherwise." And to say this is the hap-
piest thing anyone can say, if they say it truthfully and without self-deception. 
Therefore, Aristotle's account of happiness helps us understand the structure of 
Christian convictions insofar as he helps us understand in what manner they 
make us happy. 
The difference between Aristotle and Christianity is not that the one teaches 
us to desire happiness and the other does not. Rather, I think we will find the 
profoundest difference is the kind of person we must be if we are to be capable 
of happiness. For Aristotle, it seems we can only be happy if we achieve a self-
sufficiency that guards us against outrageous fortune. The Christian claim that 
our lives can be satisfying only to the extent they are formed in reference to a 
concrete historical individual could only strike Aristotle as the height of absurd-
ity. For that is to make our happiness depend on a historically contingent start-
ing point, a piece of luck, that we cannot control. Yet it is the claim of Christians 
that only when we learn to live our lives on that basis will we be on the way to 
living a life of happiness. 
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To return to the point I made at the beginning, it is the Christian claim that to 
the extent we learn to have our lives determined by the God we find in Jesus of 
Nazareth will we have the resource to make our deaths our own. Moreover, it is 
that resource that gives us the power to stand against the world whose power 
derives from its false promises to give our lives significance. In contrast, Chris-
tians claim that our death, even untimely, cannot be robbed of meaning, for God 
has in fact insured our life and death through the cross and resurrection of 
Christ. Thus we can die confident that we will be remembered by those future 
generations God will caJ1 to be His Church. Doesn't that sound like good news? 
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